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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis analyses the financial dynamics on the global market for land, also referred to as the ‘land 
grab’, according to the theory of financialization. This theory refers to a view of finance beyond its role 
as a provider of capital for production, but rather as a self-referential realm separate from the 
productive economy. Previous analyses of financialization with regards to the ‘land grab’ have focused 
on the commodities produced on the land. This research, rather, analyses the financialization of land 
as a product in its own right. This represent a reconceptualization different from the traditional 
understanding of land a means of production and with inherent limitations due to the immobility and 
the heterogeneity in the nature of land. It is operationalized through the proportion of financial 
institutions on the market, scale of their acquisitions, and the use of financial products. It is 
hypothesized that land is not fully financialized, and that especially the use of financial products will 
be limited.  
 
Data is gathered from the Land Matrix and GRAIN datasets and through semi-structured interviews 
with three different actors on the market. The findings show that financial institutions play a significant 
role on the market but that the extent of financialization is restricted, conform the expectation that 
financial products are limitedly employed. Rather, actors appear to move away from the separate 
realm of finance and find rapprochement with the real economy through their land investments.  
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1 Introduction  
This thesis examines the global market for agricultural land in light of the ‘land grab’, a phenomenon 
of large-scale international land acquisitions in response to the world food crisis of 2008-2009. It relies 
on a macroeconomic analysis that conceptualizes land as a commodity product in and of itself, rather 
than through its function as a means of production for other commodities, which has been the 
traditional conceptualization of land. Financialization represents the development across global 
commodity markets of profit generation through financial channels rather than through industrial or 
agricultural production. That is, the economic system comes to rely on stock markets, on the pricing 
and purchasing of financial products rather than tangible assets, and on the rising influence of 
financial institutions across industries compared to other actors such as mining or manufacturing 
firms, to name but a few (Orhangazi 2008, 3; Russi 2013, 7; Van der Zwan 2014, 99). This, then, 
translates into the following research question:  
 
Has the market for international large-scale land acquisitions witnessed a process of financialization? 
 
The results show that, while the involvement of the financial institutions is significant, land does not 
lend itself fully to a process of financialization. Its conceptualization as a commodity product remains 
restricted by its physical attributes of being immobile and heterogeneous. Where financialization of 
commodity trade has been described as a development away from the real economy towards a fully 
financialized one, the trend of land acquisitions and the interest in these assets among financial 
institutions is testimony, conversely, of an approach towards this real economy once more.
1
 
 
1.1 The ‘Land Grab’  
 
The phenomenon central to the research is commonly referred to as the ‘land grab’ by activists and 
academics alike.
2
 Alternatively, it is also referred to as the ‘land rush’.
3
 Both of these terms, and 
                                               
1
 The financialization of commodity trade is described in such a way by for example Beckert (2002, 212) and 
Gunnoe (2014, 483).  See also Chapter 5 on the topic of financialization.  
2
 An example of the activist author is Oxfam (2011)  or GRAIN (2008) and of an academic author is Hallam (2013) 
amongst others.   
3
 For example by the Land Matrix publications. See Online Quantitative Resources.  
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especially the popular terminology of ‘land grab’ contains an inherent negative judgement on the 
phenomenon as well as the actors involved (Milerová Prášková 2012, 2). It describes a process of 
malicious and/or illegal acquisition and ownership of land by grabbing it away from disenfranchised 
local populations (idem). While the term is used throughout the scholarship, its connotations are most 
closely aligned with those commentaries that refer to the ‘land grab’ as a form of neo-colonialism.
4
  
 
What the ‘land grab’ or ‘land rush’ effectively refers to is the developing trend of international large-
scale land acquisitions, which primarily involve land plots for agricultural purposes (Gunnoe 2014, 
479). Here, a government actor sells or leases a plot to a foreign actor, which can be a fellow nation 
state often acting through its sovereign wealth fund, an agribusiness corporation, a financial 
institution, or at times an industrial actor (Cotula 2012, 2; OECD 2010, 6; Woertz 2013, 150 and 154). It 
is a common occurrence for the investor to have little prior connection to agricultural business prior to 
the land investment; pension funds have included land acquisitions more and more in their investment 
portfolios, and actors like Hyundai and Daewoo have acquired large plots in Indonesia, Russia and 
Brazil (idem).
5
 The selling party typically is a government of a developing country (Hallam 2013, 47-
48). While purchasing actors range from all across the globe, the prominent investing actors mostly 
originate from China, the United States, the Gulf, or Western Europe (Hallam 2013, 47-48; Sassen 
2014, 80-81; Woertz 2013, 143).
6
 One of the main causes to have set off this trend of  ‘land grabbing’ 
is the world food crisis of 2008-2009 (Kugelman 2013, 2-5). Other factors believed to have contributed 
to this development include new biofuel policies and the financialization of food industries (idem).
7
  
 
The ‘land grab’ phenomenon has become notorious in part due to its scale (Kugelman 2013, 1; Sassen 
2014, 80). In 2011, Oxfam estimated that the total size of land sold and leased on international 
markets amounted to the size of Western Europe (Oxfam 2011, 5).
8
 The size of the some of the deals, 
reaching into the realm of 600.000 hectares, are staggering especially when compared to for example 
the size of the largest farms in the American Midwest – which are regularly described as mega farms – 
                                               
4
 The phenomenon of the ‘land grab’ is described as neocolonialism by for example Vidal (2009) in The Guardian. 
Whenever this research refers to the ‘land grab’ it does so for the sake of brevity and in an objective manner.  
5
 See also GRAIN database entries 65, 157, and 297 for deals concluded by Hyundai and Daewoo.  
6
 Most of the research on this topic dates from 2009 to 2013. Thus a development not covered here is the rise of 
remarkable selling actor, namely Australia, which can be witnessed in the news reports of farmlandgrab.org. 
Australia, other than its amount of idle land, does not fit the profile of other “land grabbed” countries. Where 
most of these nations would classify as having a developing economy, Australia resides rather undisputedly 
among the Western, industrialized economies of North America and Western Europe. The land sold in Australia is 
most often purchased by Chinese actors. Thus, the typical dynamic between developed and developing countries 
when it comes to land acquisitions finds itself reversed in this scenario.  
7
 The causes for the ‘land grab’ are further discussed in the next chapter.  
8
 The Land Matrix website visualizes this comparison in its section “It’s a Big Deal.” http://landmatrix.org/en/get-
the-idea/big-deal/  
V a n  d e r  K o l k  | 8 
 
of  approximately 4.000 hectares (MacDonald et al. 2013, iii).
9
 The types of actors involved, especially 
on the demand side of the market, and their relative distribution, are remarkable too; what one would 
consider to be the party with by far the most interest and prominence in this field – businesses in the 
agrifood sector – represent a smaller portion than one would expect compared to state actors or 
financial institutions, such as banks and hedge funds (Sassen 2014, 80; Woertz 2013, 150). 
Furthermore, several commentators, including the academia, have expressed developmental concerns 
for the countries in which the land plots are located. These doubt whether this increase in foreign 
direct investment in the agricultural sector actually contributes to the development goals of these 
countries, or whether the power dynamics rather allow the investing party to exploit weak structures 
of governance purely to their own benefit (Chasukwa 2013, 5-6; De Schutter 2011).  
 
The word is still out on the merit of these large-scale land acquisitions. For within this debate, another 
voice is heard as well. Whether the acquisitions are conducive to development or not, no 
commentator come across in this research has denied the World Bank assessment that there exists a 
yield gap on the African continent nor that the agricultural sector has received less investment 
initiative the past few decades compared to other commodity markets (Blumenthal 2013, 112). It also 
remains virtually undisputed that more productive forms of agriculture are necessary, here and 
elsewhere, to meet future population demands (Blumenthal 2013, 106). Investment capital will be 
fundamental to increase production levels; investment capital that most developing countries are 
currently not equipped to provide independently (Behnassi and Yaya 2011, 16; von Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick 2009, 2).
10
 Moreover, to counter some of the developmental concerns, an array of 
evidence is presented for FDI as a macroeconomic stimulus in developing countries (OECD 2002, 9-10; 
Nair-Reichert and Weinhold 2001, 153).  
 
1.2 In this Thesis 
 
Rather than adding to the debate on the merit of the ‘land grab’, the proposed research focuses on 
gaining a fuller understanding of the ‘land grabbing’ phenomenon and, in particular, its financial 
dynamics. It examines the extent to which a process of financialization has taken place in ‘the global 
market for land. As previously mentioned, this requires, first, a reconceptualization of land as a 
                                               
9
 The size of the ´land grabs´ is based on personal observations in the Land Matrix and GRAIN database, see also 
Online Quantitative Resources. 
10
 Dispute continues whether smallholder agriculture cannot meet the same productivity demands (Spieldoch and 
Murphy 2013, 64-65). See also chapter 2.  
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commodity product to be bought and sold for its own purpose rather than its traditional place as a 
means of production (see chapter 4). It then establishes the extent of financialization of this product 
according to the characteristics of financialization witnessed for other commodity products, such as 
biofuels and food industries.  
 
Some early indicators show that financialization is indeed present in some form, based on secondary 
sources, including the frequency of financial institutions on the purchasing side of this market and 
preliminary evidence for the acquisition of land for the purpose of financial speculation (Gunnoe 2014, 
478; Hallam 2013, 47; McMichael 2011, 1-2; Sassen 2014, 80-81; Woertz 2013, 151; ). To what extent 
does this early assessment hold up? And what are the consequences for the future of the land market?  
 
Following this introduction, the second chapter of this thesis discusses the different approaches to the 
‘land grab’ that have already been covered by other authors. These include empirical analyses of the 
phenomenon as well as social and economic critiques.  The next section (chapter 3) turns to the topic 
of financialization and starts out with covering the existing analyses of the financialization of land, in 
as far as those are available, and points out the gap in the literature; what is often covered instead of 
the financialization of land is the financialization of commodities produced on the land. This chapter 
then turns to an overview of the general principles of financialization. How does it occur and what are 
its effects? Here, three land-related commodities are covered in their financialization process. Thus, 
the third chapter offers both a theoretical and conceptual background to the analysis as well as an 
expansion of the literature review on the land grab where it concerns the financialization of land. The 
fourth chapter expands on the conceptualization of land as a commodity product that supports the 
assessment on financialization. The thesis continues with a methodology that describes its mixed-
methods design. The results are presented in two chapters, separated according to quantitative and 
qualitative results. This is followed by an overview of the overall research findings (chapter 8).  It then 
concludes with the implications of the results for our understanding of land as a commodity product 
and of the sovereignty principle (chapter 9). The very last section (chapter 10) is dedicated to 
recommendations for further research, including the preconditions for financialization and the 
potential for spill-over effects of land acquisitions on local financial markets in developing countries.  
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2 Literature Review of the ‘Land Grab’ 
The current research finds itself on the intersection of two fields of study, the topic of large-scale 
international land acquisitions and the topic of financialization, each with its own standing record in 
the academic literature. Simultaneously, the work on financialization also provides a theoretical 
background. Therefore, what is included in this literature review primarily concerns the first topic, the 
“land grab”.  The theory of financialization and its overlap with the development of land acquisitions – 
through the analyses of the financialization of food and biofuels – is treated separately in the next 
chapter.  
 
2.1 Empirical analyses 
 
In the first years following the world food crisis, the primary concern of academics was to learn 
whether a ‘land grab’ was indeed taking place, answering questions of who, how, and how much. It 
determined through data collection that the international political economy had in fact been 
witnessing a shift towards large scale land acquisitions (Transnational Institute 2012, 3). Thus, it has 
been established that deals include both outright purchases of agricultural land as well as lease 
contracts of up to 99 years in length (Behnassi and Yaya 2011, 17). It has become evident that the 
main target for acquisitions has been developing countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe (Bergdolt and Mittal 2012, 10; OECD 2010, 1). The investor-side shows a more diverse 
picture in which actors originate from Western Europe and the United States, yet also from countries 
that are themselves a target of “land grabbing” (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, 1). Prime 
examples of the latter would the states of India and China (Braütigam 2013, 91; Carmody 2013, 121). 
Finally, the aggregated data shows that there are three main types of investors: sovereign wealth 
funds and other governmental actors, multinational agribusinesses, and financial institutions.
11
 These 
institutions include banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and in one case even a consortium of global 
institutions that includes the World Bank (Cotula 2012, 2).
12
  
 
                                               
11
 See chapter 5 ´Methods´.  
12
 GRAIN database entry 316.  
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2.2 Causes of the Global ‘Land Grab’ 
 
The next question to answer is the why the ‘land grab’ occurs? Previous academic research has 
identified four main causes for the rise in large-scale international land acquisitions: 1) the world food 
crisis of 2008-2009, 2) the financial crisis of the same time period, 3) new biofuel policies including 
European subsidies, and 4) the indication of a yield gap in the agricultural sector and the promise of 
FDI to resolve it. 
 
The cause that features most prominently is the two world food crises of the twenty-first century, that 
shook commodity markets in 2008-2009 and that recurred in 2011 (Bergdolt and Mittal 2012, 7; Von 
Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, 1; Kugelman 2013, 2-5). Among the commodities affected were rice, 
corn, wheat and soybeans; all experienced considerable price rises (United Nations 2011, 61).  
 
Figure 1: The Economist Food-Price Index, 1980-2010
13
 
  
 
These price rises for staple food products caused increased levels of malnutrition and even starvation 
when (developing) countries were not able to secure sufficient produce on world market to be able to 
feed national populations (Clapp and Cohen 2009, 9; Magdoff 2008). The events showed the food 
markets volatility and the potential for crisis (Russi 2013, 49). One of the causes identified for the food 
crises is the high level of financialization that had come to characterize commodity markets (Clapp 
2013, 13-15; Isakson 2013, 1; Russi 2013, 49). The financialization of the global food economy has 
rendered it more volatile and unstable, a feature that came to fruition in the global food crises of 
2008-2009 and 2011 (idem; see also chapter 3).  
 
                                               
13
 See also in works cited: The Economist 2010.  
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The food crisis put in stark contrast the increasing necessity of food security, not only in light of price 
rises but also in anticipation of future projected overpopulation. If countries were not able to produce 
and/or purchase sufficient food to sustain current populations levels, how would they do so when 
global population levels are expected to rise exponentially, when food production cannot keep up 
with this growth, and when, with continually growing demand, food commodities will only keep rising 
in price (Gustafson and Markie 2009, 179)? The projected rise on demand and price levels turned 
arable agricultural land into an attractive investment for private actors (Sassen 2014, 81).  Questions 
on food security also caused public actors to become more invested in agricultural markets in addition 
to the commercial attraction (Kugelman 2013, 5). States entered to secure stable food production for 
national population, mostly through their respective sovereign wealth funds. Prominent actors in this 
realm have been China, India, and the oil-rich nations hailing from the Gulf region (idem).   
 
Secondly, the financial crisis is identified as an instigator (GRAIN 2008, 2). The events of the crisis 
created extreme instability and uncertainty in conventional financial investment practices. Real estate 
and mortgage plans had been a popular and profitable market for investment that occupied a large 
market share of the world’s capital flow (Hendrickson 2013, 152). The crisis caused investors include 
assets with lower risk levels in their investment portfolios; land investment met these requirements 
(Cotula 2013, 49; OECD 2010 18-20). They provide relatively secure profit returns through the long 
term potential for agricultural production and provide the potential to hedge against price inflation on 
other commodity markets (idem). In this context, land acquisitions were employed as a means of 
portfolio diversification for the investing party, to include secure investments that would be able to 
balance potential fall-out in other sectors (Blumenthal 2013, 99; Hallam 2013, 48). 
  
Thirdly, around the same time, biofuels gained in value and popularity and received heavy subsidies 
from Western powers through initiatives in 2006 and 2008 respectively (Kugelman 2013, 13). In 2006 
the European Union published a Strategic Research Agenda and established the European Biofuels 
Technology Platform (EBTP).  The policies formulated are intended to reach a 10% biofuel target in the 
use of transportation fuels by 2020 (European Commission 2013). Across the Atlantic, In the United 
States, Congress passed the 2008 U.S. Farm Bill, also titled The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 
2008. The bill included policies, including government subsidies, to stimulate maize-based and 
second-generation biofuels among a wider range of policy areas (Angelo et al. 2013, 28). Thus, 
biofuels became an attractive and profitable investment in part guaranteed though stable government 
funds (Sassen 2014, 80). Although the paths of food and biofuels eventually divert, both are at the 
start of the value chain an agricultural endeavour. It requires the same modes of production as food 
products in terms of land, labour and capital. Land on which these biofuels could be produced thus 
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became a valuable asset, primarily as a precondition to production (i.e. means of production)(Hallam 
2013, 48; Kugelman 2013, 5). 
 
Finally, scholars point towards the post-Bretton Woods order, which focused on the importance of FDI 
inflows for the development of third world countries. Foreign direct investment was labelled as one of 
the tracks to further development of the Global South (Sassen 2014, 85-92). This argument was (re-
)activated the moment global institutions, like the World Bank, published on the existing yield gap in 
the developing world around the same date as the events described above (Woertz 2013, 148; World 
Bank 2008, 7). These findings demonstrated the potential of the agricultural land in developing 
countries that it was not living up to. The gap could be remedied, it was argued, most effectively by 
increased FDI inflows in the agricultural market, which had previously known disproportionately low 
levels of FDI inflow compared to other markets; there was much to be gained here (Blumenthal 2013, 
106; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, 2; Hallam 2013, 46). 
 
2.3 Assessment of the Land Grab’s Potential and Effects 
 
Another prominent theme in the literature is the assessment of the social and environmental impact of 
the land grab, which evokes narratives and arguments concerning instances of social injustice and 
oppression of local populations. To sustain these arguments, researchers attempt to answer the 
question whether the actors involved in large-scale international land acquisitions fulfil their 
agricultural and developmental promises.  
 
The agricultural promise of land acquisitions relies on the identification of unused or underused 
agricultural land and the possibilities intensification of agricultural industries offers to global food 
production for the growing world population (Woertz 2013, 148; World Bank 2008, 7). The first issue 
of contentment is whether these land plots are indeed unused or whether they have, for example, 
pastoral or ceremonial/cultural purposes (Hallam 2013, 49; Kugelman 2013, 97; Spieldoch and Murphy 
2013, 63). Opponents emphasize the value of smallholder and pastoral economies for social diversity 
and cultural preservation (Cotula 2012, 4; Spieldoch and Murphy 2013, 64-65). Further discontentment 
arises on the ways in which agriculture is to become more efficient yet also sustainable. Some 
commentators on this front argue that smallholder agriculture can compete with industrialized 
agriculture while including more sustainable practices (HLPE 2013, 12; Spieldoch and Murpy 2013, 67-
68). The tendency towards monocultures of the industrial branch of agriculture quickly depletes the 
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productiveness of agricultural land, thus thwarting the long term goal of feeding the growing world 
population (Da Vià 2011, 4; Sassen 2014, 11). Furthermore, scholars point out the percentages of land 
acquisitions actually intended for food production relative to biofuels, which accomplishes little to 
none in fulfilling the agricultural promise to feed the world (Sassen 2014, 96). Finally, it is argued that 
current developments do not in fact correspond to current needs. The consumer of the ´land grab´ 
food products are not among those populations that need it most. In fact, most the countries where 
land is being acquired by foreign investments – where agricultural land is employed to feed 
populations abroad –  struggle with malnutrition of local populations (Kugelman 2013, 14; Woolverton 
et al. 2010, 1-2).
14
 
 
 
The advocates in favour of large-scale international land acquisitions do not necessarily disagree with 
all of the above.
15
 Often they agree that this trend has been accompanied by some problematic 
practices and that conduct can be improved upon (Hallam 2013, 53-54). They do disagree, however, 
with the argument that smallholder agriculture can become efficient enough to compete with 
industrialized methods (Blumenthal 2013, 112; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, 2). Rather, these 
commentators confirm and underlined the yield gap identified by the World Bank and the necessity to 
established larger flows of food production (idem). They rely on the historical precedent set by 
industrial agriculture, mostly in Western economies, to demonstrate its potential in this regard (idem). 
To able to realize the objective of closing the yield gap through industrialized agriculture, the market 
requires scaling and capital that is simply not within the capacity of developing countries (idem). This 
inevitably leads to the entry of multinational corporations and financial institutions on this market. 
They provide a solution that cannot otherwise be obtained.   
 
                                               
14
 Additionally, scholarship highlights the promises of development issued by investors, which include advancing 
local infrastructures, education facilities, and increase in employment opportunities for locals. Opponents 
emphasize the instances in which these promises were not kept. Instead, the investments were characterized by 
mainly negative social impact on the community. Land acquisitions were for example accompanied by evictions 
and mass migrations from the purchased land, often without consultation of local populations (Friends of the 
Earth US 2015, 26; Woertz 2013, 146). Many instances have been found in which foreign investors did not recruit 
locally. Through the acquisitions, local smallholders and other business owners who had previously worked on the 
plot were rendered unemployed and remained so through these practices (Friends of the Earth US 2015, 36).  
15
 Blumenthal (2013, 104) in a chapter aptly titled the “Investors’ Perspective” disagrees with the scale of the 
problem attributed to the ‘land grab’ by opponents. He argues that, in fact, the size of the market compared to 
other sectors of agriculture and the world economy remains relatively small. The trend and the problems it faces 
have been blown out of proportion by the media attention it has received over the last few years.  
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2.4 Policy Recommendations 
 
Few commentators, even the advocates of the land acquisitions, deny that the industry also faces its 
challenges and has known its own sets of malpractices. Some steps have already been taken to  
address these issues. The FAO has for example issued the “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security” which 
have been endorsed not only with international organizations and civil society but also by key 
multinational corporations such as Coca Cola (FAO 2014). These guidelines include for example the 
recognition of customary tenure systems and informal tenure rights practiced by local populations 
and measures to address housing security for locals in developing countries (FAO 2012). The United 
Nations also knows its “Principles of Responsible Investment” which are shared and endorsed by the 
private sector. These principles include encouraging training for investment professionals in 
environmental, social and governance sustainability and for such issues to included in the in annual 
financial reports (UNPRI ¨The Six Principles¨).  Further policy recommendations are  made, for example 
in the “The Global Farms Race” publication (Levenstein and Kugelman, eds., 2013). Here, Spieldoch 
and Murphy (2013, 66-69) argue, amongst other recommendations, for more protective legislation for 
local populations on the national level and the use of local seed varieties in agricultural development. 
Meinzen-Dick and Markelova (2013, 122-123) add the need for more transparency on these 
acquisitions and emphasize the necessity to turn voluntary guidelines into enforceable agreements.  
 
2.5 The Geopolitical Level  
 
Saskia Sassen, economist and sociologist, discusses an aspect of the ‘land grab’ debate that receives 
little attention elsewhere in the literature, namely the consequences for state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Sassen (2013, 27) argues that, whilst the land acquisitions do not imply a total 
breakdown of the sovereignty principle, sovereignty does become disassembled according to different 
pieces of territory, authority, and rights. The territory as an operational space is surrendered to foreign 
owners , and thus denationalized (idem, 43). Additionally, it impacts the experience of citizenship in 
the affected states, a principle that in the territory in question, the piece that has been sold,  has 
essentially been rendered moot (idem, 43-44).
16
  
 
                                               
16
 Sassen (2014, 115-116) repeats much of this argument in a larger work on her assessment of the global 
economic system at large in recent years.  
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McMichael (2013, 60) further comments on the geopolitical implication of the ´land grab´.  He frames 
it as an instance of “security mercantilism” in which the grab for resources and the global food regime 
contributes to the political structuring of the interstate system. Whereas one would expect 
developments in the ‘land grab’ to follow the path of free trade and contribute to the economic 
structuring of the global system, what is occurring instead is countries entering for reasons of political 
– rather than economic – security (idem). It reflects a resource competition that triggers political actors 
to secure its own access relative to other nation states (idem).   
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3 Financialization  
3.1 A Gap in the ‘Land Grab’ Analyses 
 
The overview in the previous chapter demonstrates the diverse aspects of international land 
acquisitions that are analysed in academic literature. What remains superficial in these works, however, 
is the analysis of the dynamics of the land market (Genaud 2016, 5). These analyses centre primarily on 
the products derived from these lands. Extensive work has for example been done on the 
financialization of the food and biofuel economy (e.g. Russi 2013).
17
 For each commodity, the 
academic work is geared towards proving whether financialization has occurred, to which the answer 
is almost universally a resounding ‘yes’. The analysis then commonly continue with pointing out the 
dangers of such a development, demonstrating how it occurs at the expense of both producers and 
consumers and how it is one of the main destabilizing factors of the world economy (Russi 2013, 4-
5).
18
 Within this debate on other commodity markets, the land grab is often mentioned and described 
but not discussed as the object of financialization in itself (e.g. McMichael 2011, 6-12; Russi 2013, 81-
92). 
 
When it directly concerns the intersections of land and finance, analyses cover the motivations of 
financial investors to become involved in this market. These include the potential to hedge against 
price inflation in other markets, the means of portfolio diversification, and the rewards of illiquid 
assets (Cotula 2013, 49; OECD 2010, 18-20). The most significant contribution is perhaps from 
HighQuest Partners, who conducted a study on financial investors in agricultural markets 
commissioned by OECD and published in 2010. It included both the developments in land acquisition 
as well as other types of agricultural investment, such as investments in agricultural infrastructure 
(OECD 2010, 1). The study includes geographic diversity of investors, both in origin as in target 
countries for investment (9-10, 14), activity focus in terms of crops and infrastructure (15-16), the scale 
of assets under management (12-13), policies for local impact of investments (22-27), and some 
                                               
17
 The financialization within these commodity markets as well as the financialization of carbon is elaborated upon 
in section 3.3. 
18
 Russi 2013, 4-5: “[...]  behold the majestic monstrosity of the relationship between food and finance. As the 
boundaries of food production come under pressure and are shifted and redrawn to accommodate increasingly 
complex forms of agency, the self-referentiality of an unstable financial system is projected onto the world of 
food, while the increased fragility of the food economy feeds in turn the very chaotic features of the financial 
system. Giving rise to a gigantic Leviathan that holds itself together while, at every step, risks to crumble.” 
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indications of funding sources (17). Thus, the report covers some elements of financialization such as 
scale and types of investors yet does not cover how financial institutions interact on this market, for 
example through the selling of financial products. 
 
McMichael (2011, 6-12) has a section of his paper dedicated to the financialization of the land grab. 
While McMichael makes specific mention of land acquisition, his analysis quickly returns to the 
broader phenomenon of the financialization of agricultural products; the primary focus remains on 
agricultural produce and commodities, such as grain and palm oil. Thus, McMichael ultimately joins 
the vaster body of literature on the financialization of commodity markets outlined above. Fairbairn 
(2015, 581) also discusses the financialization of land, and mentions that government policies have so 
far been ineffective in addressing the ‘land rush’. These policies take on a geopolitical character 
whereas the actual threat is a de-territorialized and financialized one (idem). Ultimately, though, her 
argument is a social rather than economic one that revolves around the locally perceived rights to 
land threatened by international acquisitions (idem, 589). More extensive analyses are available on 
domestic land purchases, closely aligned to the real-estate market. This has for example been done by 
Kaika and Ruggiero (2016) for a case study in the Milan region. The premise here is the financialization 
of the region as a whole, where land has become a financial asset while it traditionally was one of 
industrial production (idem, 7-8). The analysis nevertheless focuses in large parts on the social 
struggles that arose from this shift (idem, 3).
19
  
 
 
Thus a gap exists in the existing approaches and analyses on large-scale international land 
acquisitions and its interaction with financial markets. Whilst identity of investors is known and the 
financialization of commodities produced on the land is well established, the financialization of land 
itself as commodity product remains an under-researched topic. This, then, is what the rest of this 
thesis is dedicated to. It forms a first exploratory step to analyse whether the process of 
financialization has also taken place in the market for international land acquisitions. It assesses 
whether this process moves beyond the presence of financial institutions on this market and towards 
the use of (speculative) financial products for the commodity of land.
20
 
 
 
                                               
19
 This case would be a practical example of the real estate economics’ conceptualization of land as a financial 
asset discussed below in the conceptual framework.  
20
 A discussion of land as a commodity is at heart of chapter 4.  
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3.2 Financialization  - General Principles 
 
As Van der Zwan (2014, 99) describes it, financialization “is a view of finance beyond its role as a 
provider of capital for the productive economy.” Instead, finance has created an independent realm 
within the global economy that is separate from productive and tangible markets (Beckert 2001, 212; 
Van der Zwan 2014, 100) Financialization is theorized on three levels: the international political 
economy, internal firm structures such as stockholder value, and the level of the private citizen (Van 
der Zwan 2014, 99). For firm structures, Van der Zwan (2014, 107-110) describes the “ascendancy of 
shareholder value as a guiding principle of corporate behaviour”; that is, how decisions have become 
purely based their effects for stock markets rather than other elements of the business model such as 
the consequences for the production process or the labour force. On the level of the private citizen, 
financialization refers to the role of financial structures in everyday life, for example in the form of 
mortgages and pensions, that require laymen to become increasingly fluent in financial jargon (idem, 
111-114).  
 
Financialization as it is researched in this thesis occurs rather on the first of these three levels, the 
international political economy. It refers to the growing importance of the financial sector as the driver 
(and also destabilizer) of the world’s economic system. This type of financialization is described as “a 
regime of accumulation” (Van der Zwan 2014, 103) and defined as “a pattern in which profits accrue 
primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner 
2005, 174). Thus, it encompasses trends that define not just company behaviour but touch on the 
general fabric of economic interactions, between companies, between institutions, and between 
different types of markets.   
 
Financialization relies theoretically in many ways on Marx’s analysis of the capitalist system (Van der 
Zwan 2014, 101).
21
 It also referred to as a  form of advanced capitalism (Sassen 2013, 27; Van der 
Zwan 2014, 106).
22
 In its essence, financialization describes an extreme process of a primitive 
accumulation of wealth, (Fairbairn et al 2014, 656; Gunnoe 483; Perelman 2000, 25).
23
 Financial 
structures, furthermore, create a sense of alienation similar to the alienation of labour described by 
                                               
21
 The research proposed will follow this conceptualization of financialization including its Marxist elements. It is 
important to note however, that the theories on financialization derive concepts from Marx’s analysis of 
capitalism without necessarily following the theory’s ideological elements intent on a social and economic regime 
change. The same scrutiny applies to this thesis.  
22
 Marx’s work is of the most extensive commentaries on the capitalist system. Hence, the connection of Marxist 
terminology to the study of financialization is easy to make.  
23
 Fairbairn (2014, 654) further comments that it is the ‘land grab’ phenomenon that “has generated renewed 
interest in Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation.” 
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Marx (Clapp 2014, 797). Also found are elements of commodification, related to  the Marxist concept 
of commodity fetishism, and rentier capitalism (Monbiot 2011).
24
 
 
Specific to the concept of financialization, moving beyond Marxist analyses of the capitalist system, is 
finance’s capacity for self-referentiality. Self-referentiality refers to a financial system in which financial 
flows no longer refer to primary resources and prices are no longer based on the respective scarcity of 
each resource (Sassen 2014, 18). ‘Regular’ financial transactions (payments) rely on the monetary 
exchange value of a physical product; that is, money is paid to acquire a tangible asset (Esposito 2011, 
124; Russi 2013, 9). The complexity of financial institutions, the trading and reselling of assets on stock 
markets, and the creation of numerous types of funds mean that payments no longer have a direct 
connection to a specific asset (idem). What is acquired instead is a financial product. Financial 
transactions come to refer, then, to other financial flows (Marazzi 2014, 89). As such, finance comes to 
create a feedback loop that stands apart from the industrial and agricultural production base (Beckert 
2002, 212; Russi 2013, 13). The world of finance is therefore described as becoming separate from the 
real economy (Gunnoe 2014, 483 . The distance to the actual product created through these ‘loops of 
finance’ allows for the possibility to have financial flows grow disproportionately from the product 
base. “Finance becomes the driving force behind its own expansion” (Sassen 2014, 106). Hence, 
counterintuitively, the total amount of capital circulating on global financial markets was estimated in 
2007 to be 14 times larger than the total global GDP level (Russi 2013, 16; Sheng et al. 2009; WTO 
2008). While global GCP continued to fall due to the effects of the financial crisis, the value of bank 
assets actually kept rising (Sassen 2014, 118).  
 
Financialization, then, is enabled through a number financial products, including commodity index 
funds, commodity price indexes,  and financial derivatives. The term ‘derivative products’ comprises a 
range of financial products that include futures, swaps, and options (Arditti 1996, xv). As a collective, 
they “redefine the idea of property so as to limit to changes in the value of the particular underlying 
asset” (Russi 2013, 29). A derivative is a purely financial product, a means of financial security, whose 
value is based on the risk and price volatility of whichever asset it (indirectly) relates to (Russi 2013, 
14). This asset does not need to be owned by the owner of the derivative (Bryan and Rafferty 2006, 11; 
Russi 2013, 14). The derivative product, then, can be employed to instigate further financial 
transactions, thus contributing to the liquidity in the market in question but also creating further 
layers of distance from the original asset class (Bryan and Rafferty 2006, 154; Esposito 2011, 126; Russi 
2013, 14-15). They have currently become the most common financial product on the market (Sassen 
2014, 117) 
                                               
24
 See also n. 29. 
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Commodity indexes have been around since the 1990s (Russi 2013, 45). Each index represent a 
number of different commodities and is based on a mathematical formula of the price of different 
commodities each attributed with distinctive weights within the formula (idem). “The value of the 
index can be thought of as the price of a basket of commodities” (idem). They become used as a 
referencing system in the sales of derivatives (Clapp 2013, 8; Russi 2013, 45). The rise of commodity 
indexes has been accompanied by the rise of index speculators (Russi 2013, 44). These actors purchase 
derivatives according to price changes in the index. Derivative contracts allow these speculators, for 
example, to promise to a buyer the sales of derivatives in question at a future date without having 
bought the actual derivative at the signing of the contract. The contract contains the obligation to buy 
these at any date before the agreed upon sales date. Close to the sales date the speculator expects 
the commodity price to have gone down since the price was agreed upon in the original contract. It 
allows the speculator to buy low and sell high and make a profit (Clapp 2013, 6-7; Russi 2013, 44; 
Siddaiah 2011, 182).  
 
Derivative products and commodity indexes come in many forms. Ultimately, their use implies that 
what is traded is not in fact an actual commodity. At no point does the speculator expect to actually 
sell grain (Russi 2013, 4). Instead, financial transaction feeds into one another, creating a feedback 
loop in the world of finance (Sassen 2014, 146; Van der Zwan 2014, 106). Finance begets finance. This 
falls under the self-referentiality of finance. It is argued that the self-referential dynamics of financial 
markets have created more systemic risk in the global economic system, increasing price volatility, 
creating financial bubbles, and making crises ever more likely (Kim 2015, 712; Marazzi 2014, 89; Russi 
2013, 16; Van der Zwan 2014, 105).  
 
Other than the technicalities of financial industries and the principle of self-referentiality, the concept 
of financialization also covers the control executed by financial institutions on commodity markets and 
the value and supply chain (Clapp 2013, 18; Sassen 2014, 137). It describes each market according to 
an hourglass model (Clapp 2012, 97-99; Oxfam 2012, 11). Here, the actors as the start of the supply 
chain and the consumer are diverse and dispersed (idem). Moving towards the middle, towards the 
sectors of processing and distribution, commodity markets narrow into the realm of a few prominent 
actors. These actors, more often than not, are financial institutions (idem). These, then, ultimately 
control what products are produced and processed, and where and how they are sold. The priority 
given to monetary incentives and speculation in this middle chunk of the supply chain creates a 
detachment in the sector from the real means of production (idem).  
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3.3 Financialized Commodity Markets - Food, Biofuels, Carbon 
 
A number of commodity markets have been analysed extensively with regards to their process of 
financialization. Three examples that are related to the financialization of land are here elaborated 
upon to provide concrete examples of commodity financialization, and to compare and contrast with 
the conclusions on the financialization of land. The commodity markets described here include the 
food economy, the biofuel market, and the energy markets (moving into the realm of the 
financialization of carbon).  
 
The financialization of food is likely the most closely related to the trend of large-scale, international 
land acquisitions, i.e. ‘land grab’. The food economy has undergone three general phases in which the 
market was structured according to a recognizable set of general principles. The three phases are, 
referred to as the first, second, and third food regime. The first and second food regimes were 
characterized by the colonial order and the industrialization of agriculture respectively (Russi 2013, 34-
35). The third food regime has been distinguished to a large extent by the financialization of the 
market, alongside developments of trade liberalization, the rise of multinational corporations, and the 
growth of genetic biotechnology (Clapp 2013, 1; Russi 2013, 39). Concerning the development 
towards a financialized food economy, firstly, the market developed into an hourglass model, with 
dispersed producers and consumers but a few central players controlling the middle of the supply 
chain. These players in the food supply chain feature a strong presence of financial institutions (Clapp 
2012, 97-98; Oxfam 2012, 11; Russi 2013, 60). On the firm level, the role of financial institutions is 
significant in its shareholder influence on supermarkets, which in the food industry is the principal 
distribution channel within the supply chain. Supermarkets have taken on policies that have very little 
regard for the real-world product implications, but rather service the stockholder, that is, the financial 
institutions (Isakson 2013, 6-7; Russi 2013, 65-67) .
25
  
 
Furthermore, financial institutions – hedge funds, private equity funds, speculators - have developed 
these food assets into a complex system of financial products. Over the course of few decades, food 
commodities came to be traded through the speculative derivative products outlined in the above, 
including futures and swaps, to the point that the trading of food commodities also took the shape of 
a self-referential system (Russi 2013, 94). Additionally, the influence of the relevant commodity indexes 
                                               
25
 These types of analyses of the food economy conforms to the second realm of financialization outlined by Van 
der Zwan. She outlined three realms of financialization: the private life, the firm level, and the international 
political economy. The financialization on the firm level occurs in large parts through stock and shareholders. 
These influence, both directly and indirectly, the decision-making process. The development in supermarkets is a 
case in point of this phenomenon.  
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has turned the system into a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts (Isakson 2013, 9). The forecasted prices of 
the commodity index almost always came true. This is not attributed to the accuracy of the indexes 
per se, but rather to the fact that trade came to rely solely on the abstract forms of the real food 
commodities and the indications of their price provided by the index rather than the real-world 
circumstances of production and scarcity that would traditionally determine price levels (Clapp 2013, 
2; Isakson 2013, 9).  
 
These developments are said to have created instability and volatility in the global food economy that 
does not actually equate to any uncertainty in the supply chain itself. Thus, it is argued that the 
financialization of the industry in fact brought about the world food crisis of 2007-2008 as well as a 
few years later in 2011 (Clapp 2013, 13-15; Isakson 2013, 1; Russi 2013, 49). The issue to bring forth 
these crises was never an actual scarcity of food products (Clapp 2013, 14). Rather, the speculation 
among traders on the financial markets caused prices to rise to unsustainable levels, in turn causing 
consumers – private citizens and national governments – to be unable to acquire the necessary 
amount of food (Clapp 2013, 15; Isakson 2013, 1; Russi 2013, 49).
26
 While scarcity was not present at 
the production base of the food economy, scarcity did show on the other end of the supply chain 
(Russi 2013, 49). Indirectly, therefore, the financialization of the global food economy is linked to the 
trend of foreign land acquisitions, the ‘land grab’, for which the world food crisis has been identified 
as a prime instigator. Financialization played a distinctive role in the onset of the world food crisis, 
which has turn has been identified as one of the primary causes of a rise in large-scale, international 
land acquisitions.  
 
The biofuel industry has not known a historical development any way comparable to the food 
economy. Interest in biofuels really started to rise in the early 2000s The interest was immediately 
shared by financial institutions alongside industrial actors (Clapp and Martin 2014, 526) Similar to the 
food economy, the market has taken on an hourglass shape, where financial institutions are 
particularly powerful in the centralized middle of the supply chain (idem, 527). One of the primary 
motivations for financial institutions to invest in biofuels is the potential to hedge against rises in both 
food commodity and fuel price volatility (idem, 526). Biofuels involve some the same primary 
resources as food, such as grain seeds, and thus become similarly incorporated into a system of index 
funds and derivative trade as witnessed in food markets (De Gorter et al. 2015, 9-11). 
 
Finally, the financialization of carbon reaches beyond the commodity of oil and other fuel and energy 
markets, which today function according to the same principles of hourglass industry models and self-
                                               
26
 For the link between speculation, market volatility and ‘bubble’ effects, see section 3.1.  
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referentiality outlined above (Clapp and Martin 2011, 526). Rather, states have created a separate 
marketplace to trade emission levels in order to comply to climate change protocols. The project has 
led to a liquid global carbon market worth around 135 billion US dollars (Lohmann 2012, 86). While 
we would expect this type of market to be mostly consisting of state actors considering its close 
alliance to environmental policies, the business has been characterized by the prominence of the 
financial sector (idem, 87). After lobbying for the grants of pollution rights, carbon emission is traded 
by financial institutions according to the principles of other commodity markets (idem). It is highly 
centralized;  it centres around approximately 180 firms (idem). It has its own share of speculation and 
over-the-counter sales of derivatives, which have almost entirely detached rom the real-world carbon 
policies (idem 87 and 89). In fact, Lohmann classifies financial-sector speculators as the largest buyer 
of UN carbon credits (idem, 88).  
 
Should land be added to the growing list of financialized commodities? An answer to that question 
relies on the conceptualization of land as a commodity product. This is covered in the next chapter. 
The principles of financialization outlined and exemplified here return in the methodology where the 
operationalization of land financialization is based on the same set of characteristics 
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4 The Conceptualization of Land 
4.1 Land as a Product 
 
“Being employed in production, but not themselves produced, they [natural resources] are the 
converse of commodities which, although produced, are not used in production.” (Sraffa 1975, 
74) 
 
The quote above illustrates how in most economic theory land, as one such natural resource, has been 
referred to a means of production. This includes a diverse range of frameworks, including 
mercantilism, (neo)classical economics, and Marxism (Hubacek and Van den Bergh 2006, 6).
27
 It is one 
of the three foundational elements of the production process along with labour and capital. Across 
these framework, the role and importance of land in the production process differs. In early economic 
theories, land is considered a vital source of wealth, whilst under the influence of further 
industrialization land was slowly excluded from the models of economic growth, which then centre on 
capital and labour alone (Hubacek and Van den Bergh 2006, 15-16). In the current day, scholars have 
even moved away from the latter two, stating that what has become increasingly important in the 
production process and the generation of wealth is intellectual property and more broadly intellectual 
capital (Viedma Marti 2007, 245) 
 
Theories also describe different ways in which land generates wealth in the production process, for 
example through the exchange value of agricultural products or as a store for assets and resources 
(Hubacek and Van den Bergh 2006, 6 and 9). Similar to the pre-eminence of land among the three 
means of production, the perceived economic function of land has also changed according to 
historical developments of industrialization and beyond (Daly and Cobb 1989, 198; Hubacek and Van 
den Bergh 2006, 12). Land’s function in agricultural production had been central economic 
development. With the shift in economic focus towards industry and urbanization, the place of land in 
economic theory changes accordingly, to the point where one speaks of the “unimportance of land” 
(Hubacek and Van den Bergh 2006, 12). Even though, land has disappeared more and more into the 
background, giving way to the pre-eminence of capital and labour as production means, land 
                                               
27
 Academic overviews of the economic theories of land are scarce. Hence, the heavy reliance here on the work of 
Hubacek and Van den Bergh (2006). 
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resources remain in its most common conceptualization a means to an end rather than a potential 
end in and of itself. This is demonstrated, for example by the how land and the ´land grab´ functions 
within the discussion of commodity financialization (chapter 3.1).  
 
To answer the research question whether the trend of large-scale, international land acquisition has 
witnessed a process of financialization, this thesis takes on a different conceptualization of land. 
Rather than a means of production, it is conceptualized as a commodity product in and of itself, to be 
sold according to the dynamics of supply and demand.
28
 This conceptualization finds its precedent in 
real estate economics.
29
 Here, land features as a factor of production as well as a product (Hubacek 
and Van den Bergh 2006, 17). Within the real estate sector, I would argue, the jump from ‘land as 
means of production’ to ‘land as product’ is not as large as it would be in the agricultural land sector. 
The size of purchases is far bigger and skirts on the purchase of sovereign territory rather than just an 
agricultural plot. The size and thus the minimal capital required to become involved in land 
acquisitions limit the tradability of land  and thus its treatment as a commodity product.
30
 It adds one 
more limitation to the conceptualization as a commodity product not shared by the real estate 
market. For in both cases, the conceptualization of land has its own set of limitation due to the 
physical nature of the product. This entails that some features of other pp product cannot be applied 
to land, such as the mobility of commodities within the global market. “Land is physically immobile, 
land as space is indestructible, and land is non-homogenous, that is, no two parcels are alike” 
(Hubacek and Van den Bergh 2006, 17).  
 
                                               
28
 Sassen (2013, 26) also reconceptualizes land towards an understanding of land as a “commodity for the global 
market”. Her starting point, however, is the concept of land as national sovereign territory, taking an initial 
political perspective rather than an economic one.  
29
 While the conceptualization in real estate economics is the most relevant one in the current research, for 
example considering the role of land investments in the portfolio has taken on a similar role as real estate 
investments, it should be noted that real estate economics does not provide the only possible precedent. Note 28 
covers a precedent in political theory. In economic theory, the process of commodification features frequently in 
Marxist theory, especially when it concerns the commodification of labour. In its essence, commodification 
describes the development in which non-products gain a monetary value which comes to guide economic 
behaviour. Commodification contextualizes the conceptual framework of land as a product and provides further 
definition in its focus on monetization of social spheres (Woertz 2013, 155). It introduces the role of finance in the 
treatment of land as a product, one that can be expanded to the full development of financialization discussed 
below. Furthermore, Gunnoe (2014, 479) similarly conceptualizes land as a product within the context of the ‘land 
grab’ but includes in that conceptualization that “land as a profit center” and the fact that financial institutions 
“see land primarily as a portfolio asset” correlates directly to short-term investment incentives and speculative 
acquisitions. This is not shared as a starting assumption by the current research but remains to be tested through 
quantitative and qualitative methods.  
30
 These assumptions are confirmed in the interviews, see chapter 7.  
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The research explores this reconceptualization of land as a commodity product through one specific 
feature of the current economic system, namely financialization. A feature that has come to 
characterize other commodity markets in significant ways.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
 
The conceptual framework employed in this thesis combines the conceptualization of land as a 
commodity product with behaviour of those products on world markets, here represented by the 
development towards financialization. The hypotheses reflect the potential of land to be treated as a 
commodity product, which in turn has the potential to become a financialized commodity product. 
Yet, it also acknowledges the limitations that this conceptualization has due to the physical nature of 
the land product. In answer, then, to the research question whether the market for large-scale 
international land acquisitions has become financialized, the following hypotheses are constructed: 
 
 
H0: The market for international large-scale land acquisitions has not financialized 
H1: The nature of land as a product prevents the market for international large-scale land 
acquisitions from becoming fully financialized; financialization has partially taken place. 
H2: The market for large-scale international land acquisitions has become financialized, similar 
to other commodity markets (e.g. food and biofuels).  
 
The conceptual framework has demonstrated that, while land has the potential to be conceptualized 
as a commodity product rather than a means of production, with precedent in the real estate market, 
its capacity as a tradable good is limited by its physical properties of immobility, heterogeneity and 
consequent illiquidity (i.e. it cannot be financially standardized) as well as the sheer size of land 
acquisitions. This is expected to reflect directly on the level of financialization, which would then not 
fully come to fruition. Considering these limitations, it is expected that  the results of the research will 
support H1. This hypothesis acknowledges the potential as a product yet restricts land to become fully 
equal to other commodity products in the realm of financialization.  
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5 Methods 
 
 
A full economic and financial analysis is hindered by the lack of transparency surrounding the land 
deals as well as the constraints for time in the current thesis setting. When venturing into areas that 
are not directly included in the datasets or in secondary sources, the research will have to be one of an 
exploratory nature. As outlined below, this exploration of elements of financialization not discerned 
from available datasets is largely conducted through the means of interviews. These provide 
information from insider sources, yet the small number of interviewees inevitably renders the data 
fragmentary and the non-systematic way in which interviews were arranged according to possibility 
and availability further make the evidence circumstantial. Thus, a first step is taken within the means 
available for this thesis to ascertain whether the global market for land might have financialized.  
 
5.1 Operationalization 
 
The financialization of land is operationalized according to three basic principles found in other 
commodity markets (also outlined in the chapter 3).  
 
a) The proportion of financial institutions among investors 
 
A primary element of financialization is the identity of actors within a certain market, who for the term 
financialization to apply would identify as financial institutions. The umbrella term financial institutions 
is here understood to include all three classifications of such institutions: depositary institutions, 
contractual institutions, and investment institutions. These, in turn, include a collection of different 
business models. Depositary institutions cover banks, mortgage loan institutions, credit unions, and 
trust companies. Contractual institutions are insurance companies and pension funds. Investment 
institutions, finally, include investment banks and brokerage firms.
31
 In order to arrive at an analysis 
and conclusions on financialization, all types of financial institutions are treated equally in the data. 
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 See also: Siklos 2001, 40.  
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 The literature on financialization does not specify what threshold would need to be reached in order 
for a market to be classified as financialized, neither in absolute nor in relative terms. Instead, the 
classification often relies on a comparative method that sets the current situation off against the 
market developments two or three decades ago, depending on which market is discussed. As for 
example outlined in the conceptual framework, the literature on the financialized food economy 
mostly compares to the developments of the new millennium with the first and second food regime 
predating 1990. Additionally, comparison might be drawn between the presence and conduct of 
financial institutions and that of other actors in the supply chain such as production and 
manufacturing firms. The research conducted here for the land market operationalizes this factor of 
financialization in the same way. Whenever possible it constructs time series to observe the temporal 
developments, and interview frame questions in such a way as to incite a description of developments 
over the years. Further comparison is drawn between the data for financial institutions and that for 
other investor types, agribusinesses in particular. Financialization with regards to proportions in the 
investor base would for example demonstrate itself by numbers of financial institutions being equal to 
or even overtaking the numbers of agribusiness investors.  
 
b) The scale of purchases and capital flow 
 
A further determining factor is not only the number of financial institutions active in a certain market, 
but also the scale of assets under management relative to the rest of the market. The scale of some 
financial institutions, for example realized through mergers and centralization, as well as their 
purchasing power allow for a scenario in which these institutions do not stand out in sheer number of 
actors but rather in the control of large chunk of the market by few actors. Hence, the scale of land 
purchases – measured in hectares – and the scale of capital flow is included within the 
operationalization of financialization to complement the first factor of investor proportions. This is 
further operationalized through a comparative method similar to (a) based on time series and 
differences between investor types, financial institutions and agribusinesses in particular.  
 
The scale of capital committed to the land market extends to the growth of capital flow following 
these purchases through the means of (speculative) financial products and resulting in a self-
referential financial market, outlined under the third factor.  
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c) The use of financial instruments and products  
 
A third central element to financialization is the use of (speculative) financial instruments and 
products.
32
 It is these products that ultimately create a self-referential financial flow in which ‘finance 
begets finance’. The following products are considered specifically and referred to directly in the 
interviews (see section on qualitative research design). First, the research checks the use of commodity 
price indexes. This operationalization factor further includes the use of the derivative financial 
products.
33
 The category of financial derivatives can be further broken down into specific types, 
depending on the specific financial and contractual arrangement that they represent. Included here 
are the four most common forms of financial derivatives: forwards, futures, swaps, and options.  
 
 
For each of the three elements of financialization, three modes of operationalization can be 
constructed conform the three main hypotheses developed on the financialization of the land product 
(p. 18).  For H0, the operationalization would describe no increase and/or low numbers in the 
proportion of financial investors, no increase in market scale, and no use of (speculative) financial 
products. The operationalization of H1 would entail that one or two elements of financialization are 
present. Here it is hypothesizes that, in case H1 finds most support in the data, the use of financial 
products will be the one lacking, for this lies within the line of expectations laid out by the 
conceptualization of land as a commodity product. The limitations of this conceptualization were 
primarily attributed to the physical characteristics of land’s immobility and heterogeneity. This limits 
the land product as a tradable good and means that the asset is difficult to standardize. It is exactly 
the capacity for tradability and standardization that allows ‘regular’ commodity products to be 
packaged and developed into financial products (UNCTAD 2011, 6). The conceptualization of land, 
including its limitations, allow financial actors to enter the market (a) and commit significant amount 
of capital to this class of assets (b) but constrains the possibility to employ financial products (c). This, 
then, is the way in which H1 is expected to materialize in the quantitative and qualitative data.  For H2, 
all three elements of financialization would be demonstrable in the market and display increase over 
time.  
                                               
32
 It can be argued that investment with the intent to hedge against price inflation in other markets that appear 
elsewhere within the investment portfolio is also a form of speculative investing; it relies on the speculation of 
changes in other markets. Although acknowledged, this broad understanding of financialization is not included in 
the operationalization here. It is too far removed from the land market and has little influence on investor 
conduct on the land market itself.  
33
 While derivatives are not the only financial product employed in the market – stocks and debt would be other 
examples – derivatives and commodity indexes are identified within theories on financialization as the main 
contributor on the level of international political economy and a central factor in finance’s capacity for self-
referentiality. These are therefore the focus of the current research.    
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5.2 Quantitative research design 
 
This research has a mixed-methods design. It includes descriptive statistics to the extent that data is 
available. Since the quantitative data is not exhaustive and has its limitations in reliability, the use of 
this data is combined with qualitative methods to check for accuracy and supply information missing 
in the data. The quantitative descriptive statistics provide the following insights into general temporal 
developments: the number of deals each year and of land deals per investor type, the average size of 
land deals over time, and an indication of prices agreed upon for these deals. It also allows a limited 
insight into land purchased for speculative purposes, since datasets include information about plots 
not taken into production despite a long-standing investment.  
 
Quantitative data is derived from two main databases: the Land Matrix dataset and the GRAIN dataset. 
The datasets each have different specifications for what land deals are included and what types of 
details are provided for each. This results in their respective differences in terms of representativeness, 
reliability, and the types of analyses that can be drawn from them. They are therefore treated 
separately here. For each, the methodology of the database construction is described, its potential 
and limitations for the current research, and the types of analyses that are derived from them for this 
thesis.  
 
a) The Land Matrix 
 
The Land Matrix is the most extensive and inclusive dataset in terms of the number of deals included. 
It does not differentiate between deals intended for food crops, biofuel crops, or any other purpose. It 
spans a timeframe ranging from 2000 to 2015 and includes deals struck on international as well as 
domestic levels. The database contains information about the location of the land plot purchased, the 
investor name and country of origin, the status of the deal (whether it is still under negotiation or has 
already been taking into production) and the calendar year when that status applied, the size of the 
deal measured in hectares, and the sources from which information on this deal was gathered. At 
times, one or two categories are lacking; the category lacking most frequently being that the mention 
of the size of the deal.  
 
The Land Matrix, however, warns for the possibility of inaccuracy in its dataset. It draws from a range 
of different sources, including a network of experts, allied NGOs as well as crowdsourcing. In this 
method, the lack of transparency in the sector creates a potential bias towards those countries which 
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provide open information about its foreign investments. It also has the potential for bias due to 
disproportionate media attention around the world food crisis and shortly after (Woertz 2013, 143-
144).  It is further reported that the crosschecking method included within the dataset methodology 
leaves much room for improvement (Profundo Interview). These issues are taken into consideration in 
the analyses and conclusions. In part, a crosscheck is included in this research by including two other 
sources of data: a second dataset and practitioner interviews.  
 
The Land Matrix has been edited to meet the current research purposes. A number of entries have 
been excluded from all analyses based on their incomplete information or irrelevance to the research 
question. This entails that failed negotiations, deals still under negotiations, and deals with an unclear 
outcome have been excluded from analyses. Moreover, entries that lacked any indication of the date 
of the deal have not been taken into consideration. The total number of observations becomes 1442. 
These remaining entries are further coded according to the domestic/international dichotomy.
34
 
Under these conditions, the data observations are analysed according to the total number of deals per 
year and the total number of deals per year split according to the domestic and international level.  
 
The analysis continues solely based on the international deals, which amount to a total number of 
observations of 1003. For the analysis of plot sizes, some entries  must be excluded due to missing 
data. The number of international deals for which plot size of the deal is reported is 978. These are 
analysed according to the total number of hectares involved in international deals per year and the 
average plot size of land deals per year.  
 
Finally, the Land Matrix also includes information about deals that have not been taken into 
production or where the production project was eventually abandoned. If acquisitions were indeed 
completed for speculative reasons, those instances will be included in these totals. It should be noted, 
however, that a project might have been abandoned or production delayed for a number of reasons 
other than financial speculation. Towards the end date of the database in 2015, numbers could for 
example be explained by the short intermittent period between deal and current research. Large-scale 
agricultural enterprises, including drainage and tillage of the land, can take up to several years. Some 
                                               
34
 The original datasets specified the country where land was purchased as well as the origin country of the 
investor. Based on this information, it is easily extrapolated whether a deal would classify as an international one. 
This has been added to the dataset. Deals that involved both domestic as well as foreign investors have been 
classified as international deals. Ideally, entries would be further coded according to investor type. However, 
within the scope of the thesis it proved impossible to gather this data in any consistent and reliable manner. Not 
only is the sample too large, making this an extremely time consuming effort, the information is also hard to 
ascertain through the sources of provided for each deal; it would have required extensive searches into additional 
sources.  
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of these cases have likely been captured under the label ‘start up phase’ frequently employed in the 
database. Yet it must be recognized that the inference towards speculation becomes more uncertain 
when approaching the most recent acquisitions. Nevertheless, the data is the closest approximation to 
the ´hidden´ data on speculation that is otherwise unattainable in the current research.  
 
 
b) The GRAIN Database 
 
The second database consulted  was published in 2012 by the NGO GRAIN  and has not been updated 
since. It is the more detailed dataset of the two when it concerns the details of each deal as it includes 
of the agreed upon price for the deal and some contextual background in the notes for each entry. 
Crucially, the database identifies the type of industry for each investor, such as the financial sector, 
agricultural businesses, or telecommunications. However, the database is more selective in which deals 
are included in the first place. It does not include deals predating 2006, nor deals that have been 
cancelled or that have taken place in the domestic rather than international sphere. It is exclusively 
focused on large-scale international deals with the intended purpose of food crop production. The 
latter entails that deals intended for biofuel production have been excluded as well.
35
 GRAIN has 
employed a more rigorous method and crosscheck for all entries, thus raising the level of reliability 
and lowering the level of potential bias for the results. 
 
It is not necessary to edit the dataset in advance. For the first analyses all entries are relevant. This 
results in a total number of observations of 416. The first analysis concerns the distribution of investor 
types among the entire database. The classification of investors included in the GRAIN database has 
been reduced to four types: agribusiness, financial institution, governmental actor, and other. The 
category ‘other’ includes industrial multinationals, telecommunication enterprises, and, in one 
instance, an NGO. A select number of entries had no such classification. In these instances the entry 
was also coded under the  ‘other’ category.  Whenever more than one classification was provided, that 
is the deal is attributed to more than one category of investors, one of the first three types – financial 
institution, agribusiness, governmental actor – was given precedence in the final coding over 
classifications within the category of other. 
 
Two entries lack an indication of the plot size of the deal, reducing the number of observations to 414. 
This is used to provide the total amount of hectares purchased per investor type in the GRAIN 
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 Some crops can be developed into both food and biofuel products. In these cases, the GRAIN database treats 
the deals as potential food crop deals and they are included in the dataset.  
V a n  d e r  K o l k  | 34 
 
database and the average plot size per deal per investor type. The deals for which the agreed upon 
price for the land is reported are rarer. The total number of observations in this respect is 106. Even 
though it still qualifies as large sample, it has an inherent potential for bias created by nondisclosure 
clauses for deals similar to the Land Matrix. Here too the analysis supplies the total of amount of 
capital committed per investor type and the average amount of capital committed per deal per 
investor type.  
 
Speculation can be derived to some extent through an indirect method. The GRAIN database contains 
descriptions of each deal. The information included in these additional comments differs for each one. 
For example, while it sometimes mentions the date of the deal, this detail is missing in many of the 
entries. Similarly, some deals contain information about the duration of the lease contract, intentions 
for further acquisitions, or rather the intent to sell the plot off fairly soon. At sporadic intervals, it is 
possible to ascertain whether the deal has a long or short term character and whether the deal is 
testimony to growth and continued interest with the investor in the market of land acquisitions. 
Considering the irregularity of this data, it is difficult to establish the results as somehow 
representative of the trend. The amount of data is influenced by the (non)disclosure of the actors 
involved, and therefore has a strong probability of containing a selection bias. While results should be 
approached with caution, this is the only possible indication in this dataset of whether acquisitions for 
speculative purposes might have occurred between 2006 and 2012.   
 
 
The three elements of financialization are thus analysed in the quantitative data in the following ways. 
The proportion of financial institutions among other investor types is derived from the GRAIN 
database but without a sense of temporal development. The scale in monetary terms is also derived 
primarily from the GRAIN database. The scale in terms of geographic size is covered through both 
databases. Here GRAIN allows insight into the numbers per investor type while the Land Matrix is 
capable of showing the development over time. Speculation is measured through both databases, but 
only in indirect ways by means of proxy data. It should be noted that speculation as analysed here is 
limited to the moment of acquisition. The data does not provide any insight into the further trading of 
land or the use of financial instruments and products in these markets. For all analyses derived from 
the GRAIN database the primary comparison being drawn is between financial institutions and 
agribusinesses, the latter being the most relevant actor in the field expected to be the most prominent 
were it not for the possibility that financialization might have occurred. The comparisons made in the 
Land Matrix data relies on the time series that are constructed. Thus, they are in both cases conform 
to the operationalization outlined above, which specified that theories on financialization do not 
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include a minimum threshold but rather rely on comparison with other time periods and investor 
types.  
5.3 Qualitative research design36 
 
It is clear that the quantitative analysis is heavily restricted by the available data. Additional data is 
therefore gathered from inside sources through the qualitative method of semi-structured interviews. 
These are employed to crosscheck some of the results provided by the quantitative data and supply 
information impossible to from the available databases. Especially for the use of financial products 
interviews are the only source available within the scope of this research.  
 
At the outset of research, eight potential interview subjects were contacted about the thesis research 
and the requested interview. These represented three types of actors involved in the market for 
international land acquisitions, namely NGOs, investors, and professional experts such as consultants 
and branch organisations in the field of land investments. Interview requests included a brief 
explanation of the research in the financialization of land, the reason for contacting that particular 
interview subject, and an indication of the topics that would be covered in the interviews. The request 
also stipulated the possibility to ensure anonymity within the thesis.  
 
Three positive responses were received, one of from each category of potential interview subjects. The 
response from Profundo covered the NGO category. Profundo is a Dutch NGO offering research and 
advisory services for sustainable policy and management, focusing in particular on financial markets 
and natural resource supply chains. ‘Land grabbing’ is also included as one of the themes focused on 
in the research. Hence, the NGO manoeuvres exactly at the intersection researched here. The response 
from HighQuest Partners supplies the perspective of a professional experts. They offer consultancy to 
private sector agricultural businesses. One topic of expertise is foreign land acquisitions. In 2010, 
HighQuest Partners executed a research project for OECD on the topic of financial investors in the 
agricultural investments and land acquisitions (OECD 2010). The third response was from an 
investment management company in the field of agricultural investments who has requested to 
remain anonymous in the thesis. This firm manages the investments from a number of financial 
                                               
36
 While the Open Land Contracts Initiative could provide interesting insights through qualitative methods, this 
resource is not within the current scope of research. The original research design included the possibility of doing 
archival research for a contract published here that corresponds to one of the interviewed parties. The parties that 
proved willing and available for an interview, however, did not correspond the data provided through the Open 
Land Contracts Initiative. Were it to be researched separately, the data included in the Initiative at large proves 
too inconsistent to be turned into a useful data source within the scope of the current research.  
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institutions through a closed end fund. As such, it represent the investor category. Even though the 
three categories are each represented, the selection applied within that category would still qualify as 
a random sample. Selection was based on the availability of contact information and whether a 
positive response was received from the potential interview subject.  
 
Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner. The topic had been identified beforehand 
through the interview request. Each interview also opened with a further explanation of the research 
and the three subtopics within the larger concept of land financialization that would be covered in the 
interview: the current state of the market, the acquisition process, and the use of financial products. 
The state of the market included questions about the number of investors active in the field of 
international land acquisitions, indications of growth or shrinkage of the market, price changes, issues 
of transparency as experienced in the field, and the possibility of data bias due to disproportionate 
media attention.  
 
The second part, on the acquisition process, seeks out to determine the process through which 
financial institutions become involved in the land market and what external factors might influence 
their current position within it. How do plots of land become available on the market? Which party 
take the first step in the acquisition process? Are more parties involved in the bidding process before 
a deal is brokered? Here, it is amongst other things ascertained whether the proportions of financial 
investors mentioned in overviews of concluded deal is commensurate of interested parties, or whether 
the capital power and influence of these institutions distorts those numbers in any way. Thus, the first 
two parts of the interview correspond to the first two elements of financialization: the share of 
financial institutions, and the size of the assets under management and capital flow.  
 
The third part of each interview focuses on the use of financial products. Since there is no prior 
evidence of the use of such products, there is little material to build on. Thus, the first step is to see 
whether the interviewee has any knowledge in this particular area, and if so, whether examples of 
these products are indeed employed when it comes to the land market. Considering the exploratory 
nature of the research here, the interview can potentially not reach any further than these first 
questions, as was for example the case for the interview with Profundo. When it is clear that the 
interviewee does have knowledge, the interview continues to determine which instruments or 
products these include and in what way their use possibly differs from other commodity markets. The 
interview does not seek to determine the technical details beyond this level. Thus, the third part of 
each interview corresponds with the third element of financialization.  
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Questions were pre-formulated and sequenced according to these three topics within land 
financialization. However, during the interview the exchange was allowed to take a natural flow as 
much as possible. The technique of framing was used to guide the interview through the three topics, 
building bridges between the answer provided by the interview subject whenever possible. Only when 
no such bridge was available did the interview return to the pre-formulated, sequenced set of 
questions. Ultimately, all three interviews roughly followed the tripartite sequence outlined above. For 
each interview it was made sure that all questions had been covered before drawing the interview to a 
close. The method did not include a fixed interviewer behaviour and interviews were recorded through 
notetaking.
37
  
 
Interview subjects were left to interpret question in the way relevant for their professional experience 
and to give detail according to their own expertise. The interviews were not collected for their 
comparability. Rather, each interview was conducted to provide unique insights into the market for 
large-scale, international land acquisitions, each contributing in its own way to the research findings 
and conclusions, providing unique insights not found in other source material. They are 
complementary to one other rather than comparative.  
 
The results of these two methods are presented in the next two chapters respectively before being 
compiled into a comprehensive image of the market in the chapter entitled ‘Research Findings’.   
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 For many in the industry it concerns sensitive topics. In order to ensure a sense of confidentiality no recording 
equipment was employed.  
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6 Quantitative Results. 
6.1 The Land Matrix 
 
The database supplied by the Land Matrix, upon deleting incomplete entries and mentions of 
cancelled deals, contain a total of 1442 number of observations. This total includes both domestic 
deals – seller and investor originate from the same country – and international deals. Each observation 
represents one instance of acquisition. The development in the number of deals per year for both 
categories provides figure 2. 
 
 
 
The number of deals shows a significant growth starting approximately in 2005 and reaching its peak 
between 2007 and 2012. Shrinkage is witnessed from 2010 onwards to the point that, by 2015, 
numbers have been reduced to levels lower than those observed in 2000. The Land Matrix contains 24 
deals concluded in the year 2000 compared to 14 deals in 2015. The latter is increased over tenfold in 
2009 when the total number of observations reaches 189 instances of large-scale land acquisitions. 
This figure, however, does not determine whether the changes are purely witnessed on the 
international level. The next figure visualizes the subdivision of the total number of deals according to 
the domestic/international dichotomy.  
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Figure 2: Total number of land deals per year included in Land 
Matrix 
V a n  d e r  K o l k  | 39 
 
 
 
Here, it is shown that the shifts in the number of deals should primarily be attributed to the 
developments on the international level. The first few years, levels of domestic and international deals 
are virtually equal to one another, arguably up to and including the year 2005. In 2006, the number of 
international deals is double the amount of domestic ones and eventually reaches a level where 
numbers are more than tripled. While the number of international deals grows significantly, the 
number of deals on the domestic level display little change. During the period of growth levels largely 
remain within the range of 30 to 45 instances of land acquisitions, and in only one occasion reach a 
total of 56.  
 
While the Land Matrix does not include observations of deal size in a monetary sense, i.e. financial 
capital invested per deal, it does include data on the size of the plot that has been purchased and 
sold. Figures 4 and 5 visualize, first, the total amount of hectares involved in international deals per 
year and, second, the plot size in hectares per deal per year. The total number of hectares per year 
corresponds approximately to the development established in the above of a rising trend since 2000, 
particularly high levels between 2008 and 2011, and a decline thereafter. Interestingly, the amount of 
decline witnessed in 2012 is relatively much larger in the amount of hectares purchased than in the 
acquisition numbers above. While the amount of deals drops from 2011 to 2012 by 32%, for the total 
decline in terms of the amount of hectares this measures a remarkable 71%.  
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The average amount of hectares per deal does not show a clear line of development in the period 
2000-2015 conform to the bell curve of the other figures. The period 2008-2011 does show some of 
the highest average plot sizes, but those are rivalled by the averages witnessed in 2001 and 2002. It 
therefore does not follow that the rise of the land acquisitions was commensurably accompanied by 
the increase in plot size for each deal. The rise observed in figure 4 is primarily to be attributed to 
higher numbers of international deals per year, not to the acquisitions themselves growing in size.  
 
The Land Matrix also includes information about deals that have not been taken into production or 
where the production project was eventually abandoned. The following table and figure 6 include the 
total number of deals per year that have been abandoned or cancelled after purchase or that have 
simply not been taken  into production as of yet. If acquisitions were indeed completed for speculative 
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reasons, those instances will be included in these totals. It remains by all means proxy data as 
described in the methodology.  
 
Table 1: Proportions of potentially speculative deals in the Land Matrix Database 
Calendar Year Total number of land 
deals 
Suspected speculative deals Speculation 
percentage of total 
2000 13 1 8% 
2001 12 1 8% 
2002 15 1 7% 
2003 25 3 12% 
2004 31 5 16% 
2005 44 5 11% 
2006 82 17 21% 
2007 127 23 18% 
2008 128 17 13% 
2009 128 21 16% 
2010 123 29 24% 
2011 119 37 31% 
2012 81 37 46% 
2013 44 13 30% 
2014 22 12 55% 
2015 10 6 60% 
 
 
 
The relative number of deals suspected of serving a speculative purpose shows a rising trend. A rising 
number is to be expected in the last few years included in the database, for example from 2012 
onwards, which can be attributed to the short time that was allows for the start of production as 
described in the above. However, an increase is already witnessed from 2007 onwards and arguably 
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Figure 6: Suspected relative speculation numbers in the Land Matrix  
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from the very first year of the collected data. Therefore, it becomes more likely that speculative 
considerations have come to play a larger role in the development of large-scale international land 
acquisitions. Yet, it still concerns a small number of observations, especially when one accounts for 
alternative explanations. It would qualify as a development taking place at the margins of the land 
market.  
6.2 GRAIN 
 
On the one hand, the Land Matrix offers detailed information on the investor identity for each deal. 
Almost universally, the company name is disclosed per deal. The name, on the other hand, offers little 
direct insight into the class of investor that this actor might belong to, such as financial institutions or 
agribusinesses. While sources are provided for each entry, the information possibly derived from these 
sources remains fragmentary and classification of investors often remains illusive. The second major 
database available on this topic, collected by an NGO by the name of GRAIN, is more consistent in this 
respect, yet also more selective in others. It is restricted to deals intended for food crops (including 
multipurpose crops for both biofuel and food production). It exclusively covers the period 2006-2012. 
With some precaution, it can be said that the GRAIN database reflects the peak in land deals 
witnessed in the Land Matrix database of acquisitions in that seven year period. For this period it 
provides more detailed information on plot sizes, capital involved in land deals, and diversity of 
identities among investors. What is lacking, however, is a consistent indication of the signing date of 
the agreement. It is hard to derive any temporal development from this database. Here, the research 
has to rely solely, at least within quantitative methods, on the Land Matrix database.  
 
The number of observations included in the GRAIN database is 416. The distribution across four 
investor types – financial institutions, agribusinesses, governmental actors, and others –  from that 
total is visualized in figure 7. Agribusinesses are by far the dominant type of investor in the data. Its 
numbers are double that of the second largest grouping, namely the involvement of financial 
institutions. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that financial institutions represent approximately a 
quarter of all land investors.
38
 This does not exclude the possibility that the financial institutions would 
                                               
38
 The low amount of governmental actors, representing less than ten percent of the investors, is remarkable. 
Without prior knowledge of the ‘land grabbing’ debate, one might argue that governmental actors are equally 
unlikely players, same as financial institutions, compared to agribusiness. Yet purchasing by state actors of foreign 
lands has been highlighted time and time again as a distinctive feature of the ‘land grab’, and what made it stand 
among other developments in the international political economy. The impression of marginality given in figure 7 
is altered when one considers the average plot size purchased by governmental actors, which is considerably 
higher than other categories of investors.  
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concentrate its efforts on larger plots, and thus form a centralized trend of fewer players with a larger 
control of the industry. To check for this scenario, the next set of figures visualizes the total amount of 
hectares purchased by each investor type during the period covered by the GRAIN database and the 
average plot size per deal, also split according to the type of investor.  
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In figure 8 the total amount of hectares involved in international land acquisitions is still highest in the 
agribusiness sector, which is to expected by the high number of deals concluded in this sector. 
However, the difference between agribusiness and financial institutions has decreased. Where this 
difference in the number of deals amounted to 54%, for the total of number of hectares per sector the 
difference measures 34%. This shift is demonstrated further in figure 9, which shows that the average 
plot size purchased by financial institutions supersedes the numbers for agribusinesses. A similar 
dynamic is witnessed when one considers the amount of capital committed to international land 
acquisitions.  
 
 
Here, it is convincingly verified that financial institutions commit larger amounts of capital to 
international land acquisitions. Despite the lower number of deals, the total amount of capital in 
absolute numbers far exceeds the investment capital dedicated by agribusiness for land purchases. 
This change of roles drives the average per deal up to establish an even greater difference between 
financial institutions and agribusinesses, where the capital involved per deal for financial institutions 
more than doubles the amount for agribusinesses. This translates directly into the average price per 
hectare for the different sectors, which amounts to 8.778 dollars per hectare for financial institutions 
and 5.602 dollars for the agribusiness sector.  
 
Following the coding of the notes of each according to speculative and short-term or long-term 
perspectives and indications of further interest and growth, the GRAIN database contains thirteen 
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Figure 12: Distribution of long-term 
incentives per investor type in the GRAIN 
database 
Agribusinesses
Financial institutions
Governmental actors
Other
entries that describe a short-term intent for the land acquisitions. It describes, for example, how the 
DWS GALOF fund, launched in 2007, had a specified end date in 2016, or how the John Paul Thwaytes 
Capital Agrifund intends to exit from its acquisitions after eight to ten years.
39
 All thirteen entries are 
classified as financial institutions. Some actors recur more than once, and thus the number of financial 
institutions referenced in these thirteen entries amounts to five investment actors, who purchase an 
average of 23.622 hectares per acquisition, at the lower end of the spectrum for financial institutions 
as well as other investor types (see figure 9). 
 
The database contains 89 entries that 
testify to growth, the intent for 
further acquisitions, or long-term 
commitment with the investor (e.g. 
lease contracts of 30+ years). These 
are distributed across the four 
investor types as visualized in figure 
12. According to this graph, 
agribusiness would be the most 
committed to the purchase of 
agricultural land. This is rather 
unsurprising considering the fact that 
agriculture, where land is a primary 
necessity, is its core business. Yet, 
commitment is also present among financial institutions. Eighteen entries describe this commitment 
for financial institutions, which contain 16 individually mentioned investors, and with an average of 
41.902 hectares per acquisition. In all aspects is exceeds the numbers of potentially speculative deals.  
 
Taking into consideration the unreliability and selection bias in these numbers and the fact that the 
number of potentially speculative remains rather low, acquisition for the purpose of financial 
speculation is considered to be a feature at the margin of the land market similar to the results 
derived from the Land Matrix database. 
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 GRAIN database entries 32 and 33.  
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7 Qualitative Results 
 
For the qualitative elements of this research, three interviews were conducted with different types of 
actors. Regarding the interview with Profundo, the interviewee supplied additional documentation 
afterwards.  Some of these are found in the references elsewhere in the thesis and the bibliography 
(e.g. Cotula 2012). The interview with HighQuest Partners built on the research conducted by the firm 
at the behest of OECD (OECD 2010). This is in included in the results described below. The third 
interview was an investment management company with the focus on agricultural  investments.  
 
7.1 Profundo.  
 
Profundo is an NGO that offers research and advisory services to attain sustainability goals for a 
number of actors, including government institutions, financial institutions, research institutes, and 
other NGO’. Within this context it has both researched the ‘land grab’ phenomenon as well as the 
practices of financial institutions. However, only on rare occasions did these research subjects directly 
overlap, 
 
Concerning the current state of the market, Profundo confirms the quantitative result that 
agribusinesses, or agribusiness subsidiaries, remain the largest category of investors. Yet, in 
considering any development of financialization, it should be noted that any agribusiness capable of 
purchasing large plots of land will have additional backing from financial investors. This mainly 
concerns different forms of loans rather than actual shares, and thus direct leverage, in the firm. Thus, 
Profundo would qualify the proportion of financial institutions participating in international large-scale 
land acquisitions to be only moderate in scale and mostly operating in indirect ways.  
 
When a financial institution does show up as the primary investor, Profundo expects that this would 
most likely occur through private equity vehicles and closed end funds. These closed end funds are 
defined by a fixed number of shares at their establishment, rather than having the possibility to create 
new shares as is the case for open end funds. The fund is closed to new capital once operation 
commences; a fixed number of investors commit to the fund according to a predetermined number of 
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shares. Shares are not continuously offered for sale but can only enter the market at a pre-set date 
and according to a fixed number of shares. Furthermore, funds are not obligated to buy back shares at 
the request of investors, that is, shares are not redeemable. Closed end funds have greater freedom to 
invest in illiquid securities, such as real estate and also land. Thus, closed end funds create a lower 
amount of financial transactions than an open end fund or other investment types might create.
40
  
 
Profundo further confirms that land acquisitions are employed as a way to hedge against inflation to 
reduce risks created elsewhere in the portfolio. It is here, elsewhere in the portfolio, that speculation is 
more prominent rather than with the land investments. These are meant to create solid returns when 
these speculative efforts fail. Profundo further stresses that, even though financial institutions might 
not have a prior relation to agricultural markets or specifically to land acquisitions, most investments 
are still long-term in nature.  
 
Profundo has no specific information about the acquisition process or the use of financial products in 
the land market. It expects that the acquisition process is one of mutual rapprochement between 
buyer and seller, despite the fact that there will most likely be intermediary parties involved. It does 
not expect financial institutions to be disproportionately represented in the data due to stronger 
capital position and purchasing power. Nor does it expect that financial products are widely used in 
the industry, neither commodity indexes nor derivatives, primarily restricted by the fact that land is 
limited as a tradeable good unlike other types of commodities.  
 
7.2 HighQuest Partners 
 
HighQuest Partners is a consulting firm in the sector of agricultural investments all along the value 
chain. It, for example, supports investors in coordinating the collection of actors involved in the 
acquisition process, such as agronomists, environmentalists, legal specialists and land brokers. It also 
publishes on the topic of agricultural investment, and owns and operates the Global AgInvesting 
conferences and Oil Seed & Grain Trade conferences.  
 
The report published in 2010 by OECD, researched and written OECD, covers the rising trend of 
financial institutions involved in agricultural investment, which include farmland acquisitions as well as 
investments in agricultural infrastructure. The report establishes the fundamentals of the trend 
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 US Securities and Exchange Commission 2013.   
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witnessed up to the 2010. Here, it is demonstrated that the trend was indeed rising at the time of 
writing (OECD 2010, 6). It specifies that especially the African continent has a remarkable growth 
market, although growth is witnessed across the globe (idem, 14). It is stressed however that Africa 
has emerging financial markets still require big steps of development (idem, 9). The study includes a 
detailed look at investor motivations such as portfolio diversification and the potential to hedge 
against inflation also covered elsewhere in this thesis (idem, 18-20). An interesting feature in the OECD 
report is the data about growth estimates derived from current investors (idem, 13). Here, the report 
writes that ¨they expect the amount of capital to flow into the farmland and agricultural infrastructure 
asset class in the near future and long term will dwarf the amount already committed, ranging from 
two to three times the current level of capital committed (emphasis mine)¨ (idem). The 2010 report for 
OECD is taken as a starting point for the interview. Thus, the interview at its start asks for perspectives 
on the current market and to what extent the conclusions from 2010 still apply and the predictions 
made have come true.  
 
Concerning the current state of the market, HighQuest Partners comments that the market has 
expanded dramatically since 2010 in terms of allocated capital to the sector from institutional 
investors, number of investors involved, and the rising number of acquisitions taking place in regions 
such as Australia.
41
 The course of time has also allowed more prudent, conservative pension funds to 
become involved in the market. More and more capital is gathered, and the market is still making 
enormous progress. Yet HighQuest notes that, while progress is being made and market continues to 
grow, it is still not as mature to the same extent as other (commodity) markets are.  Acquisitions 
continue at the same or higher rate, yet foreign land acquisitions still represent only a small 
proportion of the total global land ownership.
42
 
 
HighQuest Partners confirm the expectation expressed by Profundo of a mutual rapprochement in the 
acquisition process. At times, the government in question puts out an offer memorandum on its own 
accord, whereas on other occasions a government might a approached by an investor with, for 
example, a vision of improved productivity for a particular plot of land. Financial institutions do not 
have any disproportionate hold over this bidding process. Instead, HighQuest Partners suggests, we 
should consider most acquisitions to come in the form of an asset management  partnership through 
General Partner/Limited Partner structure. The barrier to entry of the market is high and a successful 
                                               
41
 n. 6.  
42
 This, ultimately, remains a matter of perspective. In the introduction, it is referenced that Oxfam had equated 
the ‘land grab’ to the size of Western Europe (Oxfam 2011, 5). This is visualized the Land Matrix website under the 
section title ‘It’s  a Big Deal’. However, when one zooms out on that map, the circle of land having been ‘grabbed’ 
could indeed seem rather small compared to the expanse of land not included within this circle.  
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bid needs to cover a multitude of preconditions that include not only sufficient capital but also a 
convincing plan of operation including acute attention to responsible investing principles and industry 
sustainability standards benefiting workers, the environment, how the crops are grown, etc.. Like 
Profundo already highlighted, agribusiness investors will almost always have financial institutional 
backing. Similarly, a pension fund is rarely expected to purchase a plot and handle such a complex 
operation independently. Its bid will likely include an experienced partner in agricultural production 
responsible for creating the eventual product turnover, typically via agricultural asset managers. The 
competitive nature of industrial agriculture and complexity of such an enterprise necessitate this 
joining of forces. 
 
This competitiveness and complexity also play a part in the lack of speculation present in the land 
market, according to HighQuest Partners. Moreover, the simple amount of time it takes to make land 
acquisition profitable through agricultural production.  The process of creating profit through 
agricultural production can take several years and these types of investments usually are put in place 
for ten to up to twenty or thirty years. While long-term appreciation of land prices is one attractive 
aspect of this asset class, the amount of capital necessary to invest for that purpose alone would most 
likely be too high and create a considerable barrier that discourages these speculative endeavours. 
This is especially true for land investment horizons under 10 years.  HighQuest Partners expands on 
the investment of pension funds, whose business model of long-term, stable investments required 
through their obligation to pensioners,  matches up with the long-term and stable nature of farmland 
acquisitions. Similar to real-estate investments, farmland investments are well suited as a portion of 
the investment portfolio, as means of diversification, providing annual cash flows, potential for long-
term appreciation, and a hedge against risk of other investments.
 43
  This is often referred to as “Gold 
with a coupon.” 
 
Finally, on the topic of (speculative) financial products, HighQuest Partners states that few farmland 
investments entail publicly traded stocks, limiting the use of commodity indexes and derivatives on 
those stocks. It expects financial products, such as derivatives, not to be used to any considerable 
extent in the farmland market. It specifies that for exceptionally large deals, it is possible that investors 
would employ currency derivatives, but also expects these numbers to be low. 
                                               
43
 Contrary to the comments from Profundo, HighQuest Partners places the involvement of private equity funds 
not so much within the division of land acquisition but rather as investors supporting operating companies and 
manufacturing.  
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7.3 Investment Management Company 
 
The CEO of the investment management company in question describes its investment model as a 
closed end fund with  a select number of committed investors. These investors hail from the category 
of financial institutions. While the management of the company had started to work out a business 
model and to attract investors from 2006 onwards, most investors became involved in the period 2008 
to 2010. The investment phase based on the capital committed definitively in 2010 has almost been 
completed, while the company remains involved in the further development of acquired lands. It is 
currently discussing the possibility of a renewed round of investments to expand its acquisition 
portfolio. 
 
The business model is based on the acquisition of promising yet low yielding land in Eastern Europe. 
The land acquired is either made available for lease soon after, the further development of the land 
left in the hands or the leasing party, or the company takes on the improvement of land conditions 
such as drainage and infrastructure itself before eventually leasing it out to preferably local farmers. 
Hence, the main asset under management is the land itself. Even more so than with investors setting 
up production on acquired lands and basing its  income in part on the turnover of food or biofuel 
products , in this case income is solely generated by the lease of the land and the possibility to charge 
higher leases by improving land conditions and ensuring stability in the farm´s yield.  
 
The CEO recognizes the global rise of interest among financial institutional investors for whom one of 
the primary motivations is the spreading of risk in their investment portfolios. He further comments 
that the minimum ticket size to take part in funds for large-scale land investments is at such a high 
price that it requires financial institutions not only to have that kind of purchasing power but also to 
demonstrate a serious, long-term commitment. He continues by describing an extensive acquisition 
process that includes due diligence analyses in the legal, financial, agricultural, environmental, and 
social realm; testimony to the long term commitment to each acquisition.  
 
Part of the acquisition process is of course the valuation. This is done by a local certified appraiser who 
largely determines the price through comparison with sales in the vicinity of the plot in question. Yet, 
interestingly the firm mentions that it keeps its own ´shadow´ valuation of each acquisition according 
to a more progressive set of principles that mimics the valuation of real-estate. This relies more heavily 
on the principles of discounted cash flows. The investment management company expects the land 
market to eventually move in that direction, even it is still far from reaching that type of structure.  
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Finally, concerning financial products, it becomes clear that these are not used by the firm nor are they 
considered necessary within its practices. It had considered the use of currency derivatives in the past 
for one of its acquisitions but this turned out to be superfluous. Within this discussion, it is specified 
that the investment management firm was in fact based on the desire to move away from purely 
financial assets towards ‘real’ tangible assets, where the asset of choice became land. The CEO 
references JP Morgan´s “The Realization” (2009), the insecurity inherent in developments of 
financialization, and the distance created away from the  ´real´ economy. Rather than adding to this 
development, the firms was founded to find rapprochement with this real economy. Financial products 
and especially speculative and derivative financial products have little purpose in this ambition.  
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8 Research findings 
While taking into consideration all the precautions for potential bias and exploratory evidence, there 
are several findings which stem from this research. Firstly, it is important to note the different 
outcomes between the quantitative and qualitative results when it comes to the most recent 
developments in the field of large-scale, international land acquisitions. Here, the quantitative results 
show a decline since 2012 that culminates in only 15 deals concluded last year. All three respondents 
in the interviews, however, affirmed that the land market is still growing, that there is continued 
interest land acquisition and that that interest is shared by financial institutions. This discrepancy 
underlines the flaws in the two available datasets, especially in the Land Matrix. Since this dataset 
relies on crowdsourcing and media reports, it is possible that it reflects levels of public interest for the 
phenomenon rather than an accurate account of the phenomenon itself. The decline witnessed in the 
Land Matrix data could reflect a decline in public attention rather than an actual decline in 
acquisitions. Alternatively, there exists a considerable time lag for deals to become included in the 
dataset, which would also be attributable to its methodology of crowdsourcing. For the conclusion 
here the trend of land acquisitions is therefore considered to extend unto the current date, including 
the involvement of financial institutions and their effect towards financialization of the land market.  
 
Secondly, the interview with the three practitioners solidify the link made in the conceptual framework 
that connects conceptualization of land as a product to similar concepts in the real-estate market. 
Both Profundo and HighQuest Partners compare land investment to real-estate investments within the 
portfolio of a financial institution. They provide similar long-term, risk avoidance purposes. An even 
more direct connection is made by the investment management company interviewed who, internally, 
valuates acquisition according to principles of the real-estate market. For this respondent, moreover, 
land functions as the primary asset within the business model, rather than the crops its produces; land 
is the product that generates income for the firm.  
 
The three elements to financialization were as follows: the proportion of financial institutions among 
other investors, the scale of acquisitions both in plot size and in monetary terms, and the use of 
(speculative) financial products. It was hypothesized that one or two elements would be witnessed in 
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the data but that a third would me missing.
44
 That is, land as a product is not fully financialized like 
other commodity products. It is expected that the missing element will be the use of (speculative) 
financial products, due to limits on the standardization and tradability of land through its physical 
attributes different from for example food and fuel commodities.  
 
The proportion of financial institutions among other investors is only discernible in the quantitative 
data through the GRAIN database, which  does not reach beyond 2012. Here, financial institutions are 
not the dominant investor type. They represent approximately a quarter of all acquisitions. The 
respondents affirm a continued interest among financial investors for acquiring land, and the 
investment management company is an example of a financial actor interested in further acquisition 
and expansion of land assets. HighQuest Partners mentions that the market has moved beyond first-
mover investors and that more conservative financial institutions, and pension funds in particular, are 
still entering the market. It is not possible to discern from these observations whether the numbers 
relative to other investors such as agribusinesses have also shifted towards a higher proportion of 
financial institutions. Yet, the preliminary qualitative data seems to suggest that we cannot speak of 
decline either. 
 
The scale of the acquisitions is another matter. Compared to the basic investor proportions, the 
average plot size for financial investors is higher than those of agribusinesses. While the total amount 
of land purchased does not surpass it, the difference becomes smaller. Yet here a third investor type 
shows even more remarkable results. Governmental actors, while their total numbers fall behind 
compared to other categories, purchase vast plots whenever they do engage in foreign land 
acquisitions. It in monetary terms that the role of financial institutions is truly noteworthy. Financial 
institutions far outspend any other type of investor, both in total as well as relative numbers. The 
interviews check for the possibility whether the purchasing power and willingness to commit capital to 
land assets skews other data where financial institutions are concerned. This, however, does not 
appear to be the case.  
 
The quantitative data holds very little information about the use of financial products in the land 
market, speculative or otherwise. Inferential data allow some glimpse of whether speculation is at all 
one the motivations at play in this market. Considering the indirect nature of this data and the low 
numbers of potentially speculative deals in both datasets, it is fair to say that this type of speculation 
is rare. The use of financial products is covered solely in the interviews. Here, respondents have either 
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 Three hypotheses are formulated in the conceptual framework on ‘land as a product’, describing different levels 
of financialization: no financialization, some financialization, full financialization. The middle hypotheses was 
labeled as the most promising one, and if focused upon in the findings presented here.  
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no knowledge of financial products being employed with regards to land acquisitions or directly state 
that they are not used. All stress the long-term motivation that drives these investments. Additionally, 
the respondent from the investment management company describes the express intent to the move 
away from the financialized and self-referential economy that has come to characterize other 
commodity markets and instead move towards the  ¨real¨ economy and tangible assets that the 
investors is directly involved with. This not only displays a lack of financial products used but also the 
full intention to distance oneself from these instruments and the type of economy they create.  
 
Thus, the data shows that the first two elements operationalized for financialization are witnessed in 
both the quantitative and qualitative results. Financial institutions make up a considerable part of the 
investor base and are especially prominent in their spending power. The qualitative data testifies to a 
long-term interest and new market entry of financial institutions, making this an ongoing trend. This is 
where the land market shows similarities with other commodity markets such as the market for food 
products. Yet, agribusinesses remain the most prominent actor in most aspects of the market. It is only 
in the amount of capital committed to land assets and the average amount committed per acquisition 
that financial institutions are the most notable actor in the market. Therefore, even evidence for the 
first two elements of financialization, although meaningful, is limited. Furthermore, there is little to no 
use of financial products and insufficient evidence for speculative motivations. In this respect, the land 
market truly differentiates itself from ´regular´ commodity markets. The evidence suggests this 
difference is intentional from the side of financial institutions. These are aware of the developments in 
commodity trade and wish to enter a market that does not share these characteristics. 
 
In short, the research findings follow the lines of H1, which hypothesized that one or two elements of 
financialization would be present in the data and that a third, most likely that of financial products, 
would be lacking.  
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9 Conclusion 
This thesis has analysed the financialization of land within the ongoing development of large-scale 
land acquisition where previous analyses have centred primarily on the financialization of 
commodities produced on this land. Financialization is here understood as an economic paradigm 
within the international political economy that describes the growing power and influence of financial 
institutions within the value chain and the self-referentiality of finance that creates an feedback loop 
separate from the real economy. Within this analysis, land is conceptualized as a product rather than a 
means of production, similar to its conceptualization in real estate economics. 
 
The research remains limited due to incomplete datasets and fragmentary evidence. It is by all means 
an exploratory step into the financialization of land in ways rarely covered by other authors. Yet, the 
findings show that some preliminary assumptions and predictions for the future of the land market 
and the ´land grab´ found in secondary sources can be called into question.  
 
The research shows that the conceptualization of land as a product serves as a relevant one. Land has 
become the primary asset. Within the business model for one of the actors interviewed income is 
generated first and foremost through its land assets. The way this product then behaves on the 
international market place remains limited to single moments of acquisition. That is, it is rarely traded 
further. While a considerable proportion of the land market is controlled by financial institutions, 
financialization is limited to the financial identity of these investors and the capital committed to the 
market at this particular moment of acquisition. Financial products that dominate other commodity 
markets are not found for the product of land. Here, the limitations identified in the conceptualization 
– such as the immobility and heterogeneity – are suspected to play a large role in the limited 
tradability and thus financialization of land as a product. The size of the product and its 
unstandardized form reduce its capacity for the use of derivative products; they rely in large parts on 
the ability to standardize the commodity for trade on financial markets.  
 
The conclusion that financialization only applies to land in large-scale, international acquisitions to a 
minor extent has its implications for the future prospects of the market for such labels as the “selling 
of sovereignty” as applied by authors such as Sassen (2013). Firstly, for the food economy it is 
theorized that financialization has been one of the main contributing factors to the volatility in the 
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market, the creation of bubbles, and the consequent crises of recent years. The influence of financial 
institutions in the value chain of food commodities, while impacting its growth, has also rendered it 
more unstable. Here, the ´land grab´ is often included in these analyses, referencing the high interest 
of financial institutions in land acquisition. The connection made here foreshadows that the volatility 
created by financialization in commodity markets will have a spill-over effect into the “land grab”. That 
is, financial institutions will come to structure the market for land acquisitions in a similar way and 
distance this market structure away from the tangible asset and the real economy in similar ways as 
has happened with the food economy and other commodity markets. The research shows, however, 
that, despite the continued role of financial institutions in the land market, the excesses of 
financialization witnessed elsewhere are not present for land acquisitions nor does it appear likely that 
the market will develop in that direction in the (near) future. On the contrary, the evidence suggest not 
only long-term commitments and the inclusion of land investments for stability and risk aversion but 
it entails the wish to move away from these trends in other commodity markets and return to more 
tangible products and ‘un-financialized’ markets. This decreases the likelihood of a ´land bubble´.  
 
Secondly, the commentaries that refer to “selling sovereignty” describe developments that in actuality 
know more depth than offered by these authors. It should be noted that, even though it is referred to 
as large-scale acquisitions, opinion differ on how to qualify the size of the trend. Moreover, land 
ownership by private parties is not necessarily a new phenomenon even though investor 
characteristics might shift and economic globalization influences its dynamics. In relation to 
financialization, it should be recognized that the “selling” still refers to single moment of acquisition 
that involve long processes to arrive at a deal. Land is then rarely traded further nor packaged up into 
financial products or instrument to enter the market such a way. Sovereignty has not been rendered 
‘up for grabs’ on world markets through the ‘land grab’.  
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10 Recommendations for Further Research 
First and foremost there is need to expand the available datasets to represent a more complete 
picture of ‘land grabbing’ beyond 2012. Considering the confirmation from several interview 
respondents that the land market is still growing and maturing, it appears that the decline witnessed 
in the datasets is due to flagging media interest rather than actual market developments and that a 
substantial amount of data would be missing. Further quantitative support, especially as could be 
provided to the paradigm of the GRAIN database, would make future analyses on the developments 
in large-scale, international land acquisition – whether they concern financialization or not – more 
robust.  
 
Based on the current available data, further research into the financialization of land with the focus 
adopted here does not appear be a rewarding avenue to develop further trough additional research, 
several other angles remain unexplored. It is for example remarkable how certain developing countries 
receive a relative high amount of investment from financial institutions compared to other countries, 
where agribusiness or governmental investors are more prominent. This gives rise to the question 
whether there are certain preconditions within this country, whether it be its economic climate and 
policies or the sophistication of local financial markets.  
 
Furthermore, information gathered from HighQuest Partners hints to spill over effect of agricultural 
and land investments by financial institutions in developing countries into local financial markets. Its 
2010 study for OECD describes the low levels of maturity and sophistication of these markets. In 
response to the question whether this assessment should be changed in 2016, HighQuest’s CEO 
suspects that there must have been a spill over effect from these investments that would contribute to 
the further advancement of financial markets in developing countries. Further research would be 
necessary to demonstrate whether this assumption could be substantiated. This would not concern 
financialization in the sense that is conceptualized here but would gain further insights into the 
general growth of financial markets as it  relates to the ‘land grab’.  
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Online Quantitative Resources 
The Land Matrix Database 
 
The Database can be downloaded from the following webpage: landmatrix.org/get-involved/ 
   
The page ´Get the Idea´ has prefabricated statistics based on the most recent version of the database, 
that allow readers to quickly visualize the basic charateristics of the ´land grab´: landmatrix.org/en/get-
the-idea/dynamics-overview/  
 
The GRAIN Database 
 
The Database can be downloaded from the following webpage:  
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4479-grain-releases-data-set-with-over-400-global-land-grabs   
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Appendix – Interview Questions 
Profundo 
 
1. Current State of the Market 
a. To what extent does Profundo’s research still actively engage with the ‘Land Grab’? 
b. Have you noticed any change in the interest area of clients in this respect? 
c. How has Profundo observed the market for international land acquisitions since 2012? 
d. Which obstacles do you encounter in researching recent developments? 
 
2. Acquisition Process 
a. What is known at Profundo about the acquisition process for farmland? 
b. How does a land plot become available on the market? 
c. Which parties approach the other? 
d. How would a bidding process take place? 
 
3. Financial Products and Instruments 
a. What can you tell me about the use of financial products when it concerns international 
land acquisitions?  
b. Are, for example, derivative products employed on the market? 
c. Are, for example, commodity indexes employed on the market? 
d. Are there any other financial products employed that I have not mentioned? 
e. How would you describe the role of speculation on the market? 
 
HighQuest Partners 
 
1. Current State of the Market 
a. The 2010 report makes a number predictions for the growth of the market for farmland. 
Would you say that these predictions have been realized? 
b. It also states that developing countries, especially African countries, should be considered 
early-stage markets that are to mature further. Would you say that they moved in this 
direction? If yes, what would you describe the role of farmland investments to have been 
in this development.  
c. What are the current motivations for (financial) firms to enter the market for land? Has 
that changed since the 2010 report? 
d. With what kind of time frame do they enter the market compared to the data gathered in 
2010? 
 
2. Acquisition Process 
a. Could you walk me through the acquisition process of clients you represent? 
b. How does a land plot arrive on your radar? 
c. What type of seller is the most common? 
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d. What other parties are involved in the acquisition process? 
e. Do you generally encounter competition from other firms, for example through a 
bidding process? 
f. What factors determines the outcome of the potential deal? 
g. What would be an average amount of time for a plot to become productive after 
acquisition? 
 
3. Financial Products and Instruments 
a. What can you tell me about the use of financial products when it concerns international 
land acquisitions?  
b. Are, for example, derivative products employed on the market? 
c. Are, for example, commodity indexes employed on the market? 
d. Are there any other financial products employed that I have not mentioned? 
e. How would you describe the role of speculation on the market? 
 
 
 
Investment Management Company 
 
1. Current State of the Market 
a. With what motivation did the firm enter the market for farmland? 
b. What major developments have you witnessed in this market since that date? 
c. What would you estimate the current growth rate to be? 
d. How is income generated for your firm? Would other firms operate in a similar manner? 
 
2. Acquisition Process 
a. Could you walk me through your acquisition process? 
b. How does a land plot arrive on your radar? 
c. What type of seller is the most common? 
d. What other parties are involved in the acquisition process? 
e. Do you generally encounter competition from other firms, for example through a 
bidding process? 
f. What factors determines the outcome of the potential deal? 
g. What would be an average amount of time for a plot to become productive after 
acquisition? 
 
3. Financial Products and Instruments 
a. Are land plots traded further after the initial moment of acquisitions? 
b. Does your firm employ financial products or instruments, such as derivative products? 
Why, or why not? 
c. What factors potentially limit the use of financial products? 
 
 
 
